TORTS-NEW JERSEY COURT PLACES BURDEN OF PROOF ON DEFENDANTS

TO

ESTABLISH

NONCULPABILITY

WHERE

UNCON-

SCIOUS PATIENT SUFFERS INJURY NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE AND UNRELATED TO THE SCOPE OF TREATMENT-Anderson

v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
On November 14, 1967, Dr. Harold Somberg was performing a
laminectomy' on his patient, Henry Anderson, at St. James
Hospital. 2 Dr. Somberg was operating through an opening to
Anderson's spinal canal into which an angulated pituitary rongeur
(forceps) was inserted in order to effectuate the removal of disc
material. 3 The instrument had been manufactured by Lawton Instrument Co., and sold to St. James by Reinhold-Schumann, Inc., more
than four years prior to the operation in question, 4 and was provided
to Dr. Somberg by the hospital for use in this surgical procedure. 5

In the process of the operation, Dr. Somberg withdrew the
rongeur from the opening, at which time it became apparent that one
of the cups had broken off and remained within the wound. 6 Follow' A laminectomy is a surgical procedure involving the removal of an intravertebral
disc, in the instant case at the Lumbar 4-5 level. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 1,
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent].
2 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 294, 338 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975).
3 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 3, 338 A.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd,
67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). Unlike a bone rongeur, the
pituitary rongeur was fashioned for use with soft tissue and was to be manipulated "with
a direction of a longitudinal access and . . . not ... with a twisting or tortion force." Brief
for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 1, at 3.
4 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 3, 338 A.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd,
67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). The court found that it was
purchased in 1963 and that it was used exclusively for laminectomies, approximately five
times a year, during the period it was owned by the hospital. 134 N.J. Super. at 3, 338
A.2d at 36.
5 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 295, 338 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975).
6 Id. Dr. Somberg's testimony was outlined by the appellate division as stating that
in the course of the surgery when the instrument was handed to him by the
hospital nurse he made an observation of it to see if the cup or jaw of the rongeur
was present, that the edges met and also that the scissor-like jaws of the forceps
closed and opened. When he held his hand out for the instrument during surgery
his left hand at that time was inserted deep within the wound to hold the nerve
root retractor in place on the nerves. He stated: "The inspection is limited to
mobility of the handle and-I don't have to look at the handles to feel the degree
of resistance. I look at the cups and see that the edges meet. There was no other
component of my examining the instrument beyond those two aspects." This
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ing unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the fragment, the surgery was
terminated. 7 Anderson subsequently experienced complications, 8 and
a second surgery was performed by Dr. Somberg, his only purpose
being the removal of the fragment from Anderson's spinal canal. 9 Anderson ultimately "suffered significant and permanent physical injury"
of which the lodging of the rongeur fragment in his spine was the
proximate cause. 10
Anderson then brought suit against all those named earlier: the
doctor and hospital for negligence, the seller for breach of warranty,
and the manufacturer for strict liability in tort." At the close of the
proofs, the trial judge instructed the jury that on the basis of all the
evidence presented, an inference could be drawn that the breaking of
the rongeur was due to a "dereliction" on the part of some
defendant.12 Despite the charge, the jury, in answer to special interexamination took only a few seconds and he noticed nothing unusual about the
instrument.
Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 3-4, 338 A.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 67
N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
7 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 294, 338 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975).
8 Id.
9 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5, 338 A.2d 35, 37, aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338
A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
10 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 294-95, 338 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975). As explained by Dr. Somberg in his trial testimony, the injury was due to "a
retraumatization of already compromised tissues and nerve roots, taking out more of the
spinous process, as well as increased interference with the nerves and tissues." Brief for
Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 1, at 6. As a result, the plaintiff suffered an impairment
of his left leg, which condition was characterized by an expert witness for the plaintiff as
a "dropped foot." Id.
11 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 295, 338 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975). At trial a fifth defendant, Alcon Laboratories, was granted a dismissal. Brief for
Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 1, at 13a. This dismissal was not contested on appeal.
12 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 297-98 n.1, 338 A.2d 1, 4, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
279 (1975). The relevant section of the charge was as follows:
The right of the defendants to have the plaintiff bear the required burden is
a substantial one and not a mere matter of form. This burden may be sustained,
however, on the basis of all of the evidence in this case and the legitimate
inference to be drawn from it. And in this connection you may consider that the
defendants were the only one [sic] shown to have any relationship with the
pituitary rongeur which broke during the course of the operation. And you may
infer that the breaking was attributable to dereliction on the part of one or other
of the defendants in this case.
67 N.J. at 297-98 n.1, 338 A.2d at 4.
It would appear from the last sentence of the charge that the jury was permitted to
hold only one of the four defendants liable, "one or other" being the operative language.
This seems consistent with the interrogatories submitted to the jury in this action. See
note 13 infra.
This stands in sharp contrast to the eventual decision of the supreme court, which
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rogatories, concluded that "no cause" existed as to any defendant in
the action. 13

On review, the appellate division concluded that there had been
a "miscarriage of justice," and that the judgment should be reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial. 1 4 However, the judges did
not agree as to what should occur at that trial. The majority held that
under these "peculiar circumstances" a new charge had to be given
shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. 15 This conclusion was
reached by finding that the injury was "an occurrence which by it16
self bespeaks liability on the part of one or more of the defendants,"'
and that since knowledge of the cause of the injury most likely rested
with the defendants, an explanation should have been required of
them.1 7 Judge Seidman concurred in the result, but objected to charging the jury that the occurrence "indicates liability," finding this indirected a jury to hold "at least one of the defendants" in the case liable. See text
accompanying note 77 infra.
13 Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 297, 338 A.2d 1, 4, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279
(1975). The first three interrogatories submitted were consonant with the charge to the
jury. See note 12 supra. These interrogatories were:
1. Were the injuries and damages complained of by plaintiff approximately
[sic] caused by the alleged negligence or medical malpractice of Doctor Somberg
in using the Ronguer [sic] causing the tip to break during the operation performed by him on the plaintiff on November 14, 1967?
2. Were the injuries and damages complained of by plaintiff proximately
caused by the alleged negligence of St. James Hospital in maintaining, inspecting and furnishing the Ronguer [sic] to Doctor Somberg, the tip of which broke
during the course of the operation performed by him on plaintiff on November
14, 1967?
3. Was the pituitary Ronguer [sic] defective, that is not reasonably fit for
the ordinary purpose for which the Ronguer [sic] was sold and used?
Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 1, at 9a-10a.
14 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6, 338 A.2d 35, 37-38 (App. Div.
1973), aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1,cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
15Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6, 338 A.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 1973),
aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
16Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5, 338 A.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 1973),
aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). This represents a deviation in language from the phrase normally associated with an application of res ipsa
loquitur that "the occurrence . . . by itself bespeaks negligence." See, e.g., Magner v.
Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 534, 295 A.2d 363, 365 (App. Div. 1972), cert.
denied, 62 N.J. 199, 299 A.2d 733 (1973).
11Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6, 338 A.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 1973),
aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). Reliance was placed by
the majority on NOPCO Chem. Div. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 N.J. 274, 282-83, 281 A.2d
793, 797-98 (1971). For a discussion of this case see text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
One commentator, in discussing the use of res ipsa loquitur in the unconscious
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struction to be incompatible with the proposed explanatory account.18
He interpreted the "indication of liability" language of the majority
to require that the jury find one or more of the defendants liable.
However, if the jury was satisfied with the explanations offered by all
patient context, criticized the accessibility of information argument in the following
terms:
[E]ven the meager requirement of the rule of sympathy [res ipsa loquitur]that the evidence is more accessible to the defendant-doctor than to the plaintiff-patient-has not been met! The patient, no matter how unconscious during
the operation, has no trouble obtaining all of the facts if he hires a competent
attorney. Today all jurisdictions have broad rules of discovery, which compel
production of all testimony in advance of trial so that every fact is known. In
his work "Modern Trials" Melvin M. Belli .. .reveals this in the very same chapter in which he urges further extension of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the
malpractice field. Says Belli: ". . . depositions of every one of the doctors were
taken, as provided by the California procedure. . . . These depositions were
bound. Then I added the complete set of medical records from the hospital
.... These records and testimony made a volume over six inches high. Nothing
further could be said at the trial."
Morris, "Res lpsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 97, 103-04
(1958) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting from 3 M. BELLI, MODERN
TRIALS 1998 (1954)). See also Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1050-51 (1962).
A contrary position was taken in Louisell & Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 252 (1960), wherein the authors
noted that
many jurisdictions have gone far in compelling litigants generally to reveal relevant facts by making available efficient discovery devices. [There is still a
deficiency, for] in practice, even the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and of the California Code of Civil Procedure are
gauged primarily to compel disclosure after commencement of action; the victim of an injury who was unconscious during an operation may not, in the absence of res ipsa, 1,,,,it,,r

hnvp enough

information to frame a complaint.

Further, discovery can be expensive, and should not be made to do the work
that can more economically and logically be accomplished by proper placement
of the original or basic burden of disclosing facts.
Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted).
18Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 338 A.2d 35, 39 (App. Div. 1973)
(Seidman, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1,
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). Judge Seidman reasoned that
[t]o charge the jury that the occurrence indicates liability on the part of one
or more of the defendants, rather than that fault may be inferred therefrom, is
incompatible with the opportunity accorded each defendant to present facts in
explanation or exoneration, since it is conceivable the jury might find the explanatory proofs offered by each defendant acceptable. The view of my colleagues that the jury must find one or more of the defendants liable does not
explain on what basis or by what standards such determination is to be made,
other than by random selection.
134 N.J. Super. at 8, 338 A.2d at 39.
Judge Seidman's position is very similar to that of Justice Mountain in his dissent
to the supreme court's disposition of the case. See notes 87 and 126-27 infra and accompanying text.
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the defendants, Judge Seidman asked, then on what rational basis could
any defendant or defendants be found liable? 19 Certification of this
20
decision was thereafter granted.
In an opinion by Justice Pashman, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in Anderson v. Somberg, 2 l found the majority opinion of the
appellate division to be "substantially correct," 2 2 and then proceeded
to set out a new "rule of evidence"2 3 to accomplish the desired result.
The rule fashioned by the court requires that where, as in Anderson,
"an equitable alignment of duties"2 4 exists to "an unconscious or helpless patient . . .[who] suffers an admitted mishap not reasonably forseeable and unrelated to the scope of the surgery,"-2 5 the defendants
will bear the burden of "prov[ing] their nonculpability" or risk a finding of liability. 2 6 This shifting of the burden of proof was said to be
based on the "special responsibility" the defendants owed to the plain27
tiff in light of their relationship to him.
9 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 338 A.2d 35, 39 (App. Div. 1973)
(Seidman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
20 Anderson v. Somberg, 63 N.J. 586, 311 A.2d 8 (1973).
21 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975). Chief Justice Hughes
and Justice Sullivan joined in the opinion. 67 N.J. at 313, 338 A.2d at 8. Justice Jacobs
concurred in the result but not in the opinion. Id. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8.
22 67 N.J. at 298, 338 A.2d at 4.
23 Id. at 299, 338 A.2d at 5. The court stated that this rule of evidence "does not
represent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it has been traditionally understood." Id.
For the traditional elements considered in the application of the doctrine see notes
32-33 infra and accompanying text.
24 67 N.J. at 300, 338 A.2d at 6.
25Id. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5. The language here indicates that a plaintiff will have to
make some showing that the injury was outside the scope of medical treatment. In certain
cases he may have to produce expert evidence to this effect. Cf. id. at 295-96, 338 A.2d at
3-4, where the supreme court, in retrospect, apparently found such evidence embodied
in the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, who stated that the rongeur would not
have broken absent misuse or defect. In other factual situations, it might be that the
injury suffered was so obviously outside the scope of treatment that a jury could determine that fact based on its own common experience and knowledge, without any expert
testimony from the plaintiff being required. See, e.g., Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120
N.J. Super. 529, 534, 295 A.2d 363, 365 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 199, 299
A.2d 733 (1973) (flash fire during cauterization procedure caused injury to previously
healthy portions of patient's body).
2 67 N.J. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5.
27 Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6-7. The court in Anderson initially noted that
[tihe imposition of the burden of proof upon multiple defendants, even
though only one could have caused the injury, is no novelty to the law, as where
all defendants have been clearly negligent.
Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6 (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)). It was
established in Summers that two defendants had both acted negligently in firing their
shotguns. 33 Cal. 2d at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2. Therefore, the Supreme Court of California
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The rule of the plurality appears to have its foundation in the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur but gains its real vitality in its divergences from that concept. Res ipsa loquitur first emerged in Byrne
v. Boadle, 28 the now classic case of the flour barrel which rolled out
of defendant's warehouse loft onto the plaintiff, a passing pedestrian. 29 The defendant pointed to the plaintiff's lack of affirmative
proof of negligence, whereupon one of the judges, Baron Pollock, responded "res ipsa loquitur. "30 The most significant effect of the doctrine as it has developed, is to allow a plaintiff to withstand a motion
31
for dismissal and bring his cause to the jury.
As the doctrine evolved, several factors were considered as prerequisites to its application. Those factors considered most often are:
first, that the occurrence be of a kind that normally does not happen
in the absence of negligence; second, that the instrument causing the
injury have been in the exclusive control of the defendant at the time
of the injury; and third, that the plaintiff not have contributed to the
happening of the occurrence. A fourth element, occasionally mentioned, is that the evidence of the true cause of the injury be more
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. 32 These elements
held that the burden of showing which of the defendants had actually caused the harm
should rest on the negligent parties, and not on the innocent victim. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d
at 5.

The Anderson court found that in a situation involving
multiple defendants where there is no evidence as to where culpability lies, [a
shift in the burden of proof] is not generally available, . . . because it might
impose an equal hardship on an innocent defendant as on an innocent plaintiff.
67 N.J. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39,

at 223, § 40, at 231, § 41, at 243-44 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]).
However, even though the plaintiff in Anderson had not established that all defendants were negligent, the plurality found that this was an exception to the general rule in
that there existed a "special responsibility" to the plaintiff which "require[d] a shifting of
the burden of proof to defendants." 67 N.J. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6-7.
28 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
29 Id. at 722-23, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299.
30Id. at 724-25, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300.
31See id. at 723, 727-28, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299, 301. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.11, at 1099 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES] where
the authors call this procedural effect the most important aspect of the doctrine.
32 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509, at 380-84 (3d ed. 1940). This embodies the
now-traditional formulation of the elements to be found before applying res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user;
(2) Both inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have
happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party' injured. It
may be added that the particular force and justice of the rule, regarded as a
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have been applied by the courts in the development of res ipsa lo33
quitur in New Jersey.
Anderson departs substantially from the first two elements noted
above. First, the Anderson court found that on the evidence, the occurrence in question was due either to negligence on the part of
someone or a defect in the instrument causing the damage. 3 4 Second,
since either negligence or a defect was possible, the party "in control" at the critical time could not be pinpointed. 35 Therefore, the
court then allowed the inclusion of several defendants who, as a
group, represented the more probable causes of the plaintiff's injury.3 6 Anderson, however, was not the first departure from the exclupresumption throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence,
consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the
injured person.
id.
As to the fourth element in the text and the last mentioned by Wigmore, Dean
Prosser concluded that it
appears to be no more than a makeweight thrown into the scale when the court
has already reached its conclusion, and not an essential element or one which
will ever be decisive. No case has been found in which the decision would not
have been clearer if it had been entirely disregarded.
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 204 (1949).
33 See, e.g., Rose v. Port of New York Authority, 61 N.J. 129, 136, 293 A.2d 371, 375
(1972); Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 605-06, 141 A.2d 301, 306-07 (1958);
Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 269, 139 A.2d 404, 408 (1958);
Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 533, 295 A.2d 363, 364-65 (App. Div.
1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 199, 299 A.2d 733 (1973); Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super.
554, 562-63, 237 A.2d 916, 920 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38
(App. Div. 1969).
34 67 N.J. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7.
35 See id. See also note 81 infra and accompanying text.
36 Note that there had been no showing that all members of the group involved in
Anderson were negligent, only that the negligence rested somewhere in the group. See
67 N.J. at 302-03, 338 A.2d at 6-7. It is true that New Jersey courts have long recognized
"concurrent control" as satisfying the res ipsa loquitur requirement. See, e.g., Smith v.
Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 110 N.J.L. 326, 331, 164 A. 423, 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933);
Jackson v. Magnavox Corp., 116 N.J. Super. 1, 7, 280 A.2d 692, 695-96 (App. Div. 1971).
However, the expansion from "concurrent control" to seriatim control by a group is the
troublesome step, in that it leads to results far different from res ipsa loquitur as traditionally understood, and commentators have attacked such an expansion on this ground. See,
e.g., Adamson, supra note 17, at 1045-47; Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (1950). But see Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Multiple Defendants: Time for Betrothal, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 311 (1974), which analyzed the unconscious patient seriatim control situation as being one in which
the time of injury was not known; rather there was a period of time in which the
harm could have occurred. During that timespan each defendant had a duty to
the patient, even though some of the duties did not exist throughout the entire
period. When the time of injury is thus viewed as an interval rather than an
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sive control requirement in cases involving an unconscious patient

and multiple defendants. 3 7 The position seemingly emanated from the
landmark case of Ybarra v. Spangard,38 decided by the Supreme
Court of California. In Ybarra, the plaintiff underwent surgery for
the removal of his appendix. 3 9 Upon recovery from the anesthetic he
discovered that he had suffered an injury to his previously healthy

shoulder, which injury was seemingly well outside the scope of the
medical procedure. 40 The plaintiff could show neither the causationin-fact of his injury nor which of several defendants were in control at
the time of the injury. 41 The court maintained, however, that to require such a showing would frustrate the purpose underlying the
existence of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 4 2 Apparently basing its
conclusion on a special responsibility analysis, 4 3 the court concluded
that in an unusual injury situation, those who owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff would be required "to meet the inference of negligence by
giving an explanation of their conduct." 44 This was because evidence
of the injury's cause was in practice accessible to defendants but not
45
to the unconscious patient.
The Ybarra doctrine was expanded upon by the California court
in Diemnan v. Providence Hospital,4 6 in which a plaintiff, anesthetized for surgery, suffered an unusual injury. 4 7 The patient was
undergoing a process for the removal of a facial blemish that necessitated the use of a hot electric needle. 48 As the doctor was cauterizing
instant of time each defendant can be deemed to have had a concurrent duty ....
Id. at 318.
37See 67 N.J. at 299, 301, 338 A.2d at 5, 6.
38 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
39Id. at 487-88, 154 P.2d at 688.
40Id. at 488, 491, 154 P.2d at 688, 690.
41 See id. at 488-89, 491-93, 154 P.2d at 688-89, 690-91.
42Id. at 489-90, 154 P.2d at 689. The court reasoned that
[i]f the doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should not forget
that "the particular force and justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption
throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the
circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person."
Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
4'See id. at 491-92, 154 P.2d at 690. Dean Prosser stated that "[t]he basis of the
decision appears quite definitely to have been the special responsibility for the plaintiff's
safety undertaken by everyone concerned." PROSSER, supra note 27, § 39, at 223 (footnote omitted).
4425 Cal. 2d at 494, 154 P.2d at 691.
45 Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
431 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947).
47Id.at 291-92, 188 P.2d at 12-13.
48 Id.
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the wound with this needle, its operation apparently ignited an explosion, causing injury to the patient's face and her oral and nasal
passages. 4 9 A negligence action was instituted by the patient against
the hospital, surgeon, and anesthetist. 50 At the trial, res ipsa loquitur
was held to apply, yet the jury returned a verdict for the

defendants. 5 1 The plaintiff appealed, contending that the defendants'
evidence failed as a matter of law, and that the judge should have
directed the jury to find for her. 52 The court agreed, and again finding itself faced with a plaintiff who was unable to show either
causation-in-fact or exclusive control by a single individual, decided to
follow the Ybarra decision in the application of res ipsa loquitur to
53
multiple defendants.
The Anderson court "acept[ed]" the approach of the Dierman
decision and quoted the standard articulated in that case. 54 This standard had been originally adopted by the Dierinan court from a 1919
railway carrier action, 55 which required that in order to escape liability, the defendants must provide
" an affirmative showing [1] of a definite cause for the accident
in
which cause no element of negligence on the part of defendant inheres; or (2) of such care in all possible respects as necessarily to
lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have happened
from want of care, but must have been due to some unpreventable
cause, although the exact cause is unknown .... '-56

Both Ybarra and Dierrnan, while purportedly asking only for an explanatory account of defendants' conduct, have been interpreted by
several commentators, as well as the Anderson plurality, as in effect
shifting the burden of proof. 57
49Id. at 292, 188 P.2d at 12-13.
50 Id. at 291-92, 188 P.2d at 12-13.
51 Id. at 292, 188 P.2d at 13.
52 Id.

53 See id. at 292-93, 188 P.2d at 12-13. The Ybarra decision was the only case cited
by the majority as supporting the application of res ipsa loquitur. See id. at 292,
188 P.2d at 13.
5467 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6.
5 Bourguignon v. Peninsular Ry., 40 Cal. App. 689, 181 P. 669 (1919).
56 67 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6 (quoting from Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal.
2d 290, 295, 188 P.2d 12, 15 (1947)) (quoting from Bourguignon v. Peninsular Ry., 40 Cal.
App. 689, 694-95, 181 P. 669, 671 (1919)).
57See Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 299, 188 P.2d 12, 17 (Traynor, J.,
dissenting). See also Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 663-64, 226 P.2d 574, 580 (1951),
wherein Justice Traynor, in an opinion dissenting in part, stated that
[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a type of circumstantial evidence
upon which plaintiff may rely to discharge his burden of proving that his injury
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Associate (later Chief) Justice Traynor also recognized this as the
result reached and dissented in the Diernan decision. 58 He objected
to the court's using res ipsa loquitur in these negligence actions to
place defendants at a tremendous procedural disadvantage, a treatment quite possibly undeserved. 59 It appeared to him that the only
practical way for defendants to avoid liability under this standard was
to show the actual cause of the injury, thus implying that the second
element of the standard enunciated in Dierman was mere verbiage,
60
incapable of practical application.
was more probably than not the result of negligent conduct on the part of defendant. When, as in the Ybarra case, however, the court permits recovery against
defendants who plaintiff has not proved more probably than not caused his
injury, ostensibly by extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is actually
setting up a new rule of law affecting the burden of proof.
The Anderson plurality found this to be the actual result of Ybarra and Dierman
"despite some language to the contrary." 67 N.J. at 300-01, 338 A.2d at 6. This language
alluded to by the Anderson court was possibly that found in Dierman where the court
stated:
This is not to say that a defendant in a res ipsa loquitur case has the burden
of proving himself free from negligence. It is not to say that a defendant must in
every such case produce evidence of the actual cause of the accident. It is not to
say that the question of the sufficiency of a defendant's explanation-or, if he
cannot explain, the sufficiency of his evidence of due care and of impossibility of
explanation-is not ordinarily for the jury.
31 Cal. 2d at 295, 188 P.2d at 14-15 (emphasis added). See Jaffe, Res ipsa Loquitur
Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 13 (1951).
58 31 Cal. 2d at 296, 299-300, 188 P.2d at 15, 17.
59 Id. at 297, 299-300, 188 P.2d at 16, 17.
10 Id. at 299, 188 P.2d at 17. Alluding to the fact that there was some testimony in the
record to the effect that the explosion which injured the plaintiff could have been caused
by contaminated anesthetic, see id. at 297, 188 P.2d at 16, the Justice found that
[u]nder the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the majority opinion in effect imposes upon a defendant even more than the burden of proving that he was not
negligent. It imposes the burden of proving the actual cause of the accident, for
that is the only practical way under the opinion that defendants can show that
they were free from fault. The imposition of such a burden necessarily involves
the adoption of a rule on grounds of policy that persons in attendance during an
operation must explain not only their own conduct, but the conduct of any other
person, such as a manufacturer of anesthetics, who might conceivably be responsible for the accident, as well as the forces of nature that brought it about.
Such a rule would impose upon doctors, nurses, and members of hospital staffs
absolute liability for unusual accidents that they cannot explain and might discourage their attending operations. A person about to undergo an operation is
generally aware that there may be unforeseeable dangers incident thereto. He is
entitled to an explanation of the conduct of the persons attending the operation,
but he [the patient] cannot reasonably expect them to be insurers of his safety.
Id. at 299-300, 188 P.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
Lending support to Justice Traynor's position is the disposition by the California
courts of an appeal following the retrial ordered in Ybarra. At the new trial, the defendants offered explanations of their conduct, but nevertheless were unable to establish the
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The Justice thus maintained that "[t]he imposition of such a burden necessarily involve[d] the adoption of a rule on grounds of
policy." 6 1 In a later case, Justice Traynor predicted that this treating
of a rule of circumstantial evidence (res ipsa loquitur) as a rule shifting the burden of proof to defendants could only lead to confusion in
the application of the doctrine. 6 2 In Dierrnan, the Justice was disturbed by the fact that since only the doctor and hospital were defendants, they very likely would be held liable for the conduct of other
persons who might actually have been the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but who were not before the court.6 3 For this reason, Justice
Traynor asserted that Dierman would in effect make medical person64
nel "insurers" of the unconscious patient's safety.
The Anderson decision appears to mitigate any injustice which
could result from placing the burden solely upon the doctor and hospital and not on other potentially liable parties. This was done by
applying an approach found in a New Jersey bailee case, NOPCO
Chemical Division v. Blaw-Knox Co.,65 which had also involved multiple defendants who were sued under different theories of liability.66
In NOPCO, the plaintiff had purchased a piece of machinery which
after arrival was discovered to be in a damaged condition. 6 7 He then
brought an action against the manufacturer for breach of warranty,
and the carriers and bailees under a negligence theory.68 The reasoning was that it was "most probable that the damage occurred while
the machine was in the possession of one or more of [these] defendants. "69 The NOPCO court applied a rule that has been described as
cause of the plaintiffs injury. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 45-46, 208 P.2d
445, 445-46 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949). The trial judge held all defendants liable, despite their
explanations, noting that the testimony offered still did not explain away the occurrence.
Id. 61
31 Cal. 2d at 299, 188 P.2d at 17. Dean Prosser
had also found that underlying the
earlier Ybarra decision
there is obviously a deliberate policy, similar to that found in the carrier cases,
which requires the defendants to explain or pay, and goes beyond any reasonable inference from the facts; and one may surmise that this is not unconnected
with the refusal of the medical profession to testify against one another.
PROSSER, supra note 27, § 39, at 223. See also Louisell & Williams, supra note 17, at
253.
62 Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 664, 226 P.2d 574, 580 (1951).
63 See 31 Cal. 2d at 297, 188 P.2d at 16. The reference is to the manufacturer of a
tank of anesthetic, which may have been contaminated. See note 60 supra.
64 31 Cal. 2d at 300, 188 P.2d at 17.
6559 N.J. 274, 281 A.2d 793 (1971).
66 See id. at 281-82, 281 A.2d at 796-97.
67 Id.
at 278, 281 A.2d at 794-95.
66 See id. at 278, 281-82, 281 A.2d at 794-95, 796-97.
69 Id. at 281, 281 A.2d at 796.
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"akin to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,"70 which shifted to the defendants the burden of going forward with an explanation of their
conduct. 7 1 This shift was based, in part-as were those mandated
in Ybarra and Diermnan---on the finding that information as to the actual occurrence was " 'peculiarly within their [the defendants'] possession.' "72
Significantly, the Anderson plurality went beyond the explanatory account required by NOPCO in mandating that the defendants
prove their "nonculpability" in order to escape liability. 73 The court
was careful to emphasize that the plaintiff had joined all potentially
liable parties 74 and that at the close of the evidence the defendants
had not established any viable alternative theories as to the cause of
the mishap. 75 The court therefore stated that since the defendants
represented the only possible causes of the plaintiff's injury, 76 "at
least one of the defendants could not sustain his burden of proof"
and, consequently, that a verdict was required in favor of the plaintiff
against one or more of the defendants. 77 The court reasoned that any
' 78
other result "would be a contradiction in logic. "
70 Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 6-7, 338 A.2d 35, 38 (App. Div. 1973)
(Seidman, J., concurring), aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 279 (1975).
The supreme court in deciding Anderson adopted this language. 67 N.J. at 299-300, 338
A.2d at 5.
7159 N.J. at 283, 281 A.2d at 797. The court noted that the
view of requiring defendants, in a transportation-bailee situation, sued in the
alternative when plaintiff is in doubt as to which is liable, to come forward with
[an explanatory account of their conduct] finds precedent in other jurisdictions.
Id.
72 Id. at 282-83, 281 A.2d at 797 (quoting from Nopco Chem. Co. v. Blaw-Knox Co.,
113 N.J. Super. 19, 24, 272 A.2d 549, 551 (App. Div. 1971) (Carton, J., dissenting)). Cf.
note 42 supra.
7367 N.J. at 298, 300, 338 A.2d at 5, 6. The court held "that a mere shift in the
burden of going forward, as adopted in NOPCO, is insufficient." Id. at 300, 338 A.2d at
6. While increasing the defendant's burden may substantially affect the outcome of a
particular case, however, its effect on the law generally might be minimal inasmuch as
once res ipsa loquitur is held to apply, "[p]laintiffs rarely lose .. . at the jury's hands,
except where a defendant's explanation of the accident is factually very convincing (a
relatively rare occurrence)." 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 31, § 19.11, at 1099 (footnote omitted).
7467 N.J. at 295, 303, 338 A.2d at 3, 7.
75Id. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7. The court concluded that after all the evidence had
been presented, there still
was no explanation for the occurrence in the case save for negligence or defect
on the part of someone connected with the manufacture, handling, or use of the
instrument.
Id.
76 Id. at 299, 338 A.2d at 5.
77Id. at 298, 300, 338 A.2d at 4, 6.
78Id. at 304, 338 A.2d at 8.
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The Anderson dissent, written by Justice Mountain, 79 noted that
the basic premise of the plurality's holding was that all those who
might have been liable for the plaintiff's injury were before the
court. 8 0 It was asserted that this was not so because "perhaps as many
as twenty" other surgeons might have used the instrument while it
was owned by the hospital, so that the group of potentially liable
parties was not complete. 8 ' In any event, the dissenters were prepared to accept the application of res ipsa loquitur to the doctor and
79 Justice Mountain was joined in his dissent by Justice Clifford and Judge Collester (sitting by designation). Id. at 305, 313, 338 A.2d at 8, 12.
SOId. at 305-06, 338 A.2d at 9.
"1 Id. The significance of the previous use by others not parties to the action was
enhanced by the fact that neither the expert called by the plaintiff nor the expert called
by the manufacturer-defendant could establish a point in time at which any misuse had
occurred. Reference was made to part of the cross-examination of the plaintiffs medical
expert:
Q Well, Doctor, suppose-assume, if you would, that on a prior occasion
the rongeur had been used improperly, exerting too much force and
the cup had been bent by a surgeon who just happened to have-who
just happened to be on the hospital staff, had privileges at the hospital
and the doctor straightened it, would that weaken the instrument?
A Yes.
Q And that could at a later date cause it to break, isn't that correct?
A Yes, sir....
During the interrogation of John Carroll, an expert in metallurgy called by
defendant, Lawton Instrument Co., the following colloquies took place:
Q Do you think it [the rongeur] was overstrained, though, in its use?
A At some point during its use. I couldn't say specifically when....
Q Now, you said, I believe, that at some point in the use it [the rongeur]
was over-strained?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what did you mean by that?
A I meant that, to use a technical term, it was loaded beyond the yield
point. And the yield point of a material is a load at which it loses elasticity, does not return to the original shape.
Q But you can handle over-straining without simultaneous fracture, can't
you?
Q Any time you bend anything you strain it.
Q And if you bend it sufficiently enough during the course of its use at
some point in time it's going to break because it's far over-strained
above the point of its ability to take a pressure or load?
A In the sense that over-straining means weakening.
Q Right. So that it is possible for an instrument such as a pituitary rongeur to be weakened through use over a period of time and at a final
point in time break?
A Yes, sir ....
Q So then you found, Mr. Carroll, that it had been stressed?
A Yes, sir.
Q Beyond it's [sic] ability to tolerate, is that correct?
A That's correct, sir.
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hospital, sued under negligence theories, allowing it to shift to these
defendants the burden of furnishing an account of their conduct,
which explanation might have been sufficient to establish their "lack
of fault." 82 However, the dissent refused to agree to the application of
the new doctrine to the warranty or strict liability claims,8 3 or to the
effect of this new rule in making the defendants a group from which
"one or more must be singled out to respond in damages." 84
It was
pointed out that these had never been the accepted practices in New
Jersey law prior to Anderson. 85 The objection echoed that of Judge
Seidman in the appellate division, in that if an explanatory account
were required and if that account were found to be sufficient by the
jury, then the mandate that at least one defendant be held liable was
said to provide no rational guide for the jury to follow in their selecQ
A

Stressed over a period of time perhaps, probably?
I couldn't answer that as to time, sir. It could have happened during
the course of one operation or many operations.
Q You know it was stressed beyond its ability to tolerate that stress?
A Yes, sir.
Q In its use?
A Yes.
Q The point of time you can't pinpoint?
A I cannot....
Id. at 307-08 n.2, 338 A.2d at 9-10 (citations omitted).
82 Id. at 310, 338 A.2d at 11. See Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 606,
141 A.2d 301, 307 (1958).
83 67 N.J. at 309-10 nn.4, 5, 338 A.2d at 10-11.
84 Id. at 311, 338 A.2d at 11 (emphasis in original). See text accompanying notes
74-78 supra.
85 67 N.J. at 310, 338 A.2d at 11. Traditionally in New Jersey the inference of negligence raised by res ipsa loquitur or any other form of circumstantial evidence is only a
permissible on-e, requiring at most an explanatory acount of defendant's conduct in

order to counter the inference. See, e.g., Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595,
605-06, 141 A.2d 301, 306-07 (1958); Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J.
263, 269, 139 A.2d 404, 408 (1958).
This is the general practice in res ipsa loquitur cases, for there may be several
inferences available to the jury at the close of evidence, none so compelling as to cause
a court to rule as a matter of law that the inference must be drawn. PROSSER, supra note
27, § 40, at 228-30. However, there are occasionally cases where the inference is so
strong that no reasonable man could reject it, and in the absence of an explanation by
the defendant a directed verdict for the plaintiff should be forthcoming. Id. at 229-30.
Examples of such are: "the human toe in the plug of chewing tobacco, the collision of
railway trains trying to run on the same track, rear end collisions with a stationary vehicle, and the like." Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918); Rouse v. Hornsby, 67 F. 219 (8th Cir. 1895), appeal
dismissed, 161 U.S. 588 (1896); Gagosian v. Burdick's Television & Appliances, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 316, 62 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967)).
The plurality in Anderson would seemingly find so strong an inference in a case
where a foreign object remains within the patient, "a fact which bespeaks tortious conduct on the part of somebody." 67 N.J. at 303-04, 338 A.2d at 7 (footnote omitted).
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tion process. 86 The trial would thereby, in the words of the dissent,
become "no more a rational process than were trial by ordeal or trial
87
by combat."
One of the common threads running through Ybarra, Dierman,
NOPCO, and Anderson is the requirement that the plaintiff be eliminated as a possible cause for the occurrence. This had been the case
in res ipsa loquitur 88 and is perpetuated in the Anderson rule. 89 Also,
the decisions in these cases allow inclusion of several defendants who
individually represent probable causes of the injury. In this extension
to multiple defendants, the fact pattern, rather than the theory of
liability under which defendants are sued, is apparently determinative in deciding whether the Anderson rule will be applied.90
8See 67 N.J. at 311-12, 338 A.2d at 11-12. See also text accompanying note 19
su pra.
87 67 N.J. at 312, 338 A.2d at 12. This is based on the dissenters' belief that there
existed other possible parties whose negligence was the cause of the rongeur's breaking, id. at 306-07, 338 A.2d at 9, and their view that an explanation should be all that is
required of a defendant, id. at 310, 338 A.2d at 11. Therefore, if a jury were to find all
defendants' explanatory accounts satisfactory, yet remained under a
compulsion to reach a verdict against someone, . . . [ilt then becomes a mere
game of chance. There being no rational guide, each jury may proceed as the
whimsy of the moment dictates. Thus we have trial by lot, or by chance ...
And yet it is the very essence of the judicial process that a determination
reached by a court shall be the result of a rational study and analysis of applicable fact and law.
Id. at 312, 338 A.2d at 12 (emphasis by the court).
88 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
9 67 N.J. at 303, 305, 338 A.2d at 7, 8. In unconscious patient cases, this is almost a
foregone conclusion, as the patient "is entirely passive during the process, at least so far
as volitional conduct is concerned. He knowingly does no act." Louisell & Williams,
supra note 17, at 252.
While in NOPCO, there was a possibility that the plaintiff's own workmen had
caused the complained-of damage, a fact which would have defeated the plaintiff's action, the supreme court on appeal found that the evidence on this contention was insufficient to raise a jury question. 59 N.J. at 281 n.2, 281 A.2d at 796.
Similarly, the Anderson court "note[d] that at the close of all the evidence, no reasonable suggestion had been offered that the occurrence could have arisen because of
plaintiff's contributory negligence." 67 N.J. at 303, 388 A.2d at 7. See also Comment,
The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 34 ALBANY
L. REV. 106, 109 (1969).
90 67 N.J. at 302 n.2, 338 A.2d at 7.
In discussing the defendants' burden of "prov[ing] their freedom from liability,"
the court stated that the
shift is applicable only in the particular factual situation involved in this type of
case. In this factual pattern where such a shift is appropriate, it does not depend
upon the specific theory of liability advanced by the plaintiff; in a factual situation where such a shift is not appropriate, the plaintiff cannot obtain its benefits
by choosing one legal theory or another.
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As noted earlier, under the Anderson rule the requirements of
res ipsa loquitur that defendants have exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the injury and that the occurrence more likely than
not be the result of a particular defendant's lack of care, have been
substantially modified. 9 ' This is especially apparent in Anderson,
where two of the defendants, the manufacturer and the seller of the
rongeur, seemingly had not had any contact with the instrument for
over four years. 92 Thus it is the group, as a unit, which more likely
than not contains the party or parties ultimately responsible for the
93
injury to the plaintiff.
In the dissenters' view the plurality's rationale for extending potential liability to multiple defendants was undercut by the existence
of others who also appeared potentially liable, but were not parties to
the actions. 94 The dissent asserted that this in effect resulted in a
"visiting [of] liability . . . upon parties who are more probably than
not totally free of blame." 95 The plurality, however, dismissed this as
91 See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
67 N.J. 296, 338 A.2d at 3.
93 Note that res ipsa loquitur, as traditionally applied, is a form of circumstantial
evidence which gives rise to a probability that the defendants' conduct was the cause of
the injury. If there are other equally probable causes, the burden is on the plaintiff to
eliminate them, or to reduce them to a point where the defendant is most probably the
cause. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 39, at 218-19. See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 182-83, 186, 199 A.2d 826, 829, 831 (1964) (where sanding disk shattered injuring plaintiff, res ipsa available only if plaintiff establishes nonexistence of
misuse or damage after defendant relinquished control); Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 272-73, 139 A.2d 404, 410 (1958) (intervening actions too slight to
negate probability that manufacturing defect caused injury from exploding bottle).
in Anderon the group of defendants were all in control of the instrument sequentially: manufacturer to seller to hospital to Dr. Somberg. As one commentator has noted,
the use of res ipsa loquitur to those in seriatim control
where the injury may have occurred by the act of any one of them unobserved by
the others is using the doctrine to accomplish a result without reference to the
reasons for it or to its limitations.
Seavey, supra note 36, at 646.
The Anderson rule is not res ipsa loquitur in its classical form. See notes 32-33 supra
and accompanying text. Hence its application is not restrained by the same considerations as to control, nor is the burden on the plaintiff to eliminate all possible causes for
the injury. See 67 N.J. at 299-300, 338 A.2d at 5. Instead, the court described the rule as
applying to those defendants who represent equally probable causes. Id. at 300, 303 n.3,
338 A.2d at 5, 7. The new rule shifts the plaintiff's burden in a res ipsa case to its
negative form in requiring the defendants to establish any other possible causes beyond
mere speculation in order to counter the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 303, 305, 338
A.2d at 7, 8.
94 67 N.J. at 306-08, 338 A.2d at 9-10 (Mountain, J., dissenting). See note 81 supra
and accompanying text.
95 67 N.J. at 306, 338 A.2d at 9. This is very similar to Chief Justice Traynor's position
in his dissent in Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 299-300, 188 P.2d 12, 17
92
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nothing more than "judicial hyperbole," their position being that all
those who owed a duty to the plaintiff and who represented the only
possible causes of the injury, as established by the evidence, were
before the court. 96 According to the plurality, the burden rested with
the defendants to raise this contention of other possible causes and
97
parties to a level of more than "pure and undisguised speculation.It was asserted that "[i]t would be exceedingly unjust to deny plaintiff
compensation simply because an imaginative defendant can conceive
of other possible parties." 98
Another important consideration in the Ybarra, Dierman,
NOPCO, and Anderson decisions, was the defendants' superior
knowledge of the cause of the plaintiff's damages. 99 This factor was
seen by Dean Prosser' 0 0 as one result of the crossbreeding of the
doctrine of Byrne, the first res ipsa loquitur case, and the rule illustrated by Christie v. Griggs,1° 1 a carrier action wherein the court
held that because of the responsibility undertaken to the passenger,
the carrier should bear the burden of proving that it had taken all
possible precautions to avoid the incident. 10 2 Dean Prosser found
(1947), where he found that the defendants were to be held liable even though there
were other possible causes and parties that had not been eliminated from consideration.
See note 60 supra.
96 67 N.J. at 304-05, 338 A.2d at 8.
97 Id. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8. The court stated that
[n]one of the defendants introduced any evidence to actually support the claim
of responsibility by other persons; they made no effort to join additional parties.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98 Id.
99 See 25 Cal. 2d at 289-90, 154 P.2d at 689; 31 Cal. 2d at 295-96, 188 P.2d at 14, 15;
59 N.J. at 282, 281 A.2d at 797; 67 N.J. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8.
This is especially justifiable when the fact pattern involves an unconscious patient
whose plight has been summarized as follows:
He knows nothing by direct perception from shortly after the moment anesthesia
is administered until he regains consciousness, usually away from the place of
the operation, in a recover' room or his own hospital room. No such principle as
lack of vigilance or diligence, properly invoked in some other areas of the law,
could logically or equitably operate to penalize him for not knowing more about
the transaction involved.
Louisell & Williams, supra note 17, at 252. This seems to comport with the California
court's finding in Ybarra that the underlying purpose of res ipsa loquitur was to compel
those with superior knowledge to provide that material at trial. See note 42 supra.
The Anderson court found that the case of an innocent plaintiff should not fail "by
reason of defendants who have it within their power to prove nonculpability but do not
do so." 67 N.J. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8 (citing Broder, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1969).
00 Prosser, supra note 32, at 188-89, 202.
101 2 Campbell's Nisi Prius 79, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1809).
102 Id. at 80-81, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1088-89.
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that it was "perhaps inevitable" that res ipsa loquitur and the carrier
rule would combine to become a "monster child" emphasizing superior
knowledge 10 3 and creating a "bewildering" confusion as to the doc10 4
trine's procedural effect.
That the same kind of entwining is still occurring is evidenced by
the decisions in Diernan, and especially Anderson, wherein the court
first held applicable res ipsa loquitur, or rather something "akin to res
ipsa loquitur,"'10 5 and then applied a standard originally used in a
103 Prosser, supra note 32, at 184-89.
104 Id.

at 187. First of all, there is disparity in the results of factually similar cases,

due primarily to the trial court's decision as to whether res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
Louisell & Williams, supra note 17, at 253-54. Once held to apply, there then arises the
question of what procedural effect res ipsa is to be given, the possibilities being that the
doctrine could
(1) merely permit but not require an inference of negligence, (2) create a presumption of negligence, requiring a conclusion in accord therewith in the absence of adequate explanation, or (3) actually shift the true burden of proof or
persuasion on the issue of negligence to defendant ....
Id. at 225. The courts have been "confused" in their efforts to answer the question, id., a
confusion typified in one opinion which in its course "invoked all of the following
concepts: 'prima facie case,' 'presumption,' 'compulsive presumption,' 'presumption of
law,' 'probable negligence[,]' . . . 'preponderance of the evidence[,]' [and] 'inference.' "
Id. at 258 (quoting from Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 556-60, 328 P.2d 88, 95-97 (1958)).
See Adamson, supra note 17, at 1043.
The New Jersey cases applying res ipsa have not been immune from the confusion
surrounding the doctrine. See, e.g., Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 533,
295 A.2d 363, 365 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 199, 299 A.2d 733 (1973), where
the court concluded that it was
difficult, if not inadvisable, to instruct juries in terms of legal doctrines such as
res ipsa-this is especially true in medical malpractice cases where the facts
differ so widely from other types of negligence or products liability cases, and
expert medical testimony is normally required. Instructing juries as to permitted
inferences, presumptions, prima facie cases, burden of proof, shifting of burden
of proof, as is often done in non-medical malpractice cases, even though the
same principles may be applicable, rarely is helpful to a jury in a medical malpractice case-particularly where no explanation for the accident is given.
See also PROSSER, supra note 27, § 40, at 230. Prosser found a small number of
jurisdictions that allow res ipsa loquitur to give rise to a presumption rather than an
inference, which presumption requires a verdict for plaintiff in the absence of a sufficient
rebuttal by defendants. Id. He noted that these jurisdictions require a shift in the burden
of proof in all res ipsa cases. Id. These decisions were traced back to the carrier actions
and the burden applied therein. Dean Prosser concluded that
[t]he survival of such an early attitude .. .may have been due to a more or less
conscious policy of requiring the defendant to produce evidence explaining the
accident or pay. Since in some cases at least he will be unable to explain, this
results in imposing upon him the losses due to such unexplainable events, and
so may amount to the imposition of strict liability without fault.
Id. (footnote omitted).
10567 N.J. at 299-300, 338 A.2d at 5-6. A similar concept has been called the "conditional res ipsa doctrine," Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 166, 397 P.2d
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railway-carrier action. 10 6 Prior to Anderson, Dean Prosser had analyzed the combining in these situations 10 7 and concluded that "[t]here
are cases where a special relation between the parties should impose
upon the defendants the burden of proof."' 08 Prosser found the special-responsibility analysis to be the foundation of the Ybarra decision.' 0 9 In coming to this conclusion, Prosser further stated that this
rule has nothing to do with res ipsa loquitur as it is commonly
understood and applied, and it should be recognized as a distinct
and separate rule of policy. 110

The Anderson court did not rely on res ipsa loquitur to reach its
result, but instead formulated a separate and distinct rule of evidence
based on a special-responsibility analysis."' This analysis is relatively
obvious in its application to the doctor and hospital, because they had
actual custody of the patient. 112 However, the Anderson plurality
extended the special-responsibility analysis by holding that the manufacturer and seller were included in this special relationship, not
because of a warranty or strict liability theory, 1 13 but because the
manufacturer and seller owed prospective patients a duty of care. 114
A recent commentator in the field, Professor Thode, maintained
that the relationship of an unconscious patient to those involved in
medical treatment is analogous to that of a bailee to the owner of the
property entrusted to him." 5 Thode stated that if a plaintiff, under
existing law, leased a bed to a hospital and its leg were broken, the
161, 167, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583 (1964), or, as one commentator phrased it,
California
res ipsa.' " Adamson, supra note 17, at 1049.
106 See 67 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6. See also text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
107 See Prosser, supra note 32, at 221-25.
108 Id. at 234.
109 PROSSER, supra note 27, § 39, at 223. Justice Traynor also recognized the special
relationship basis in these circumstances, finding the association "between an unconscious patient and those who [had] undertaken to treat him" analogous to that of passenger and carrier. Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 664, 226 P.2d 558, 580 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
110 Prosser, supra note 32, at 234 (footnote omitted).
1 67 N.J. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6-7.
112 The doctor and hospital, having custody of the patient's unconscious body, are
obviously in a relationship based on the highest form of trust. See Broder, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Cases, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 421, 426 (1969); Louisell &
Williams, supra note 17, at 252-54.
113 See 67 N.J. at 295, 338 A.2d at 3.
114 Id. at 298, 302, 338 A.2d at 5, 7.
115 Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy Part of His Body.?, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8. The idea for the bailment
analogy was credited to Professor Seavey. See id. at 5-6; cf. Seavey, supra note 36, at
646-47.
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risk of unexplained damage would be borne by defendant hospital. 116
He asked why the burden should be any different where the plaintiff
entrusted the care of his person to another."x 7 He therefore advocated that the risk of unexplained, unusual injuries be forthrightly
allocated to those who had custody of the patient or who owed him
a duty of care, the cost of such allocation to be borne by the entire
activity of medical treatment." 8 While the Anderson court did not
expressly accept Thode's allocation-of-risk approach," 9 this may be
the effective result of the holding because the court apparently requires that in order for a defendant to avoid liability, he must prove
that the injury's actual cause originated in a third party.' 2 0 Such a
conclusion is consistent with the court's requiring a verdict for the
plaintiff, because at the close of all the evidence "no explanation for
the occurrence in the case [was offered by defendants] save for negligence or defect on the part of" one of them.' 2 ' In effect, one or
more of the defendants will be held liable if they fail in this burden;
the result appears to be that advocated by Thode, the court's seeming
rejection of his basis for recovery notwithstanding.
It may be observed that the plurality and dissenting opinions in
Anderson did not precisely line up on opposite sides of the same
issue. Instead, they appear to take very different tacks in dealing with
Thode, supra note 115, at 8.
Id.
i'
Id. at 11-12. The author went on to note that
[t]here are additional policy considerations which weigh in favor of placing
the risk on the defendants. If it is known what happened to plaintiff, such knowl1"

117

t

ed-ge- is wi hin

contol
..

one or more of the defendants, not plaintiff. If tort

law has a prophylactic effect in some situations . . . then this is one of them;
placing the risk of unexplained injuries on the defendants could result in better
procedures and more protection for the unconscious patient. Another consideration is that while no single defendant is legally responsible for the conduct of all
of the defendants, a concert of action does exist in the sense that all defendants
must work together in protecting and caring for the unconscious patient.
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
119See 67 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6. Professor Thode's analysis confined itself to
those present during the plaintiff's unconsciousness, that is, the doctors and hospital. See
Thode, supra note 115, at 5, 10. This was most likely due to the nature of the situations
he was discussing, wherein the instrumentality causing the plaintiff's injury was never
pinpointed. See id. at 10-11. Where the instrumentality causing the injury can be identified, however, as was the rongeur in Anderson, there seems to be no bar to extending
Professor Thode's reasoning to encompass the manufacturer and seller if their conduct is
a possible causal factor. See id. at 10.
The Anderson plurality apparently found this to be the result of Thode's reasoning.
67 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6.
120 See 67 N.J. at 301, 303, 338 A.2d at 6, 7. Cf. note 60 supra and accompanying text.
121 67 N.J. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7.
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the situation before the court. For the plurality the equities simply
demanded that
[a] wholly faultless plaintiff should not fail in his cause of action
by reason of defendants who have it within their power to prove
nonculpability but do not do so. 122
Even the dissenters found themselves impelled to "hope that when
an unconscious patient is injured in some unforeseen and unforeseeable way, due reparation will be forthcoming."1 23 This hope was tempered, however, by the dissenters' desire for conceptual consistency
in the application of res ipsa loquitur. 124 Even more disturbing to the
dissenters was their view that this decision merely rectified an injustice to an innocent plaintiff by replacing it with a new injustice to the
innocent defendants, 125 visited upon them "in a wholly irrational
way. "126
In any event, there are many questions left unanswered by Anderson which will become important in its aftermath. For example,
could a defendant obtain a dismissal as to himself by showing that he
is not an equally probable cause of the occurrence, and if so,
how? 1 2 7 Conversely, if a defendant could establish beyond mere
122 Id. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8. But see Adamson, supra note 17, at 1047 ("most (if
not
all)" defendants would be incapable of proving causation in fact).
123 67 N.J. at 308, 338 A.2d at 10 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
124 See id. at 308-10, 338 A.2d at 10-11.
125 Id. at 308, 313, 338 A.2d at 10, 12. The dissent asserted that
[i]n the face of this uncontroverted proof that the surgical instrument had been
used upon approximately twenty earlier occasions and possibly by the same
number of different surgeons, in the hands of any of whom it may have been
fatally misused, how then can it be said that the wrongdoer is surely in court!
There is a far greater likelihood that he is no party to this litigation at all and that
his identity will never be established.
Id. at 307-08, 338 A.2d at 9-10.
A different view is that of Thode, supra note 115, at 12, who is convinced that an'
injustice that may exist to defendants in similar situations is dwarfed by the injustice to
the plaintiff-patient under a contrary rule. Id. The Anderson case seeks to minimize any
unfairness to defendants, apparently by requiring the inclusion of agents of equally probable causes before the burden of proof is shifted. See 67 N.J. at 298, 303, 338 A.2d at 5, 7.
126 67 N.J. at 306, 338 A.2d at 9. See Seavey, supra note 36, at 648.
127 Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967), may
provide some clue. In Clark, two of the defendants, a surgeon and anesthesiologist, were
performing a bone reduction on plaintiff's ankle when she began to show signs of recovering from the anesthetic causing premature termination of the procedure. Id. at 402-04,
426 P.2d at 528-29, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 127-29. Subsequent complications prohibited the
performance of a second operation to complete the procedure, thus enhancing the risk of
osteoarthritis, which did in fact develop. Id. at 404-05, 426 P.2d at 529, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
129. In discussing what level defendants' proofs must reach, the court reviewed the
analysis of the courts in Ybarra and Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d

1975]

NOTES

speculation the existence of another equally probable cause whose
agent was not present among the defendants, would this be sufficient
to negate the plaintiff's prima facie case, or could mere joinder of the
new party satisfy this deficiency? 12 8 Additionally, it is unclear
whether it will be proper for a trial judge to instruct the jury that the
only way for a defendant to escape liability is to show the actual cause
of the plaintiff's injury, and that the defendant was not involved in
that cause, or whether the judge should also charge the jury that a
defendant may be found free of liability upon a showing of such care
as to eliminate himself as a factor in the injury, although its cause
509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956) and concluded:
Ybarra and Leonard establish that, if the conditions giving rise to the doctrine are present when the medical personnel are treated as a group acting in
concert and they collectively have access to the chief evidence as to the cause of
the injury but the plaintiff does not, a single doctor may not escape the inference
as a matter of law merely by showing that as to him alone it is more probable
than not that he was free from fault. The basis of the application of the doctrine
to all defendants in the cases is that the medical personnel acted as a group and
that collectively, without regard to what any one may individually know, or did,
they are in a position to explain the cause and produce the chief evidence
bearing on the question whereas the plaintiff is not. To avoid the inference as a
matter of law an individual doctor must go beyond showing that is was unlikely
or not probable he was negligent and must establish that he is free from negligence by evidence which cannot be rationally disbelieved. Falling short of such
a showing, it remains for the jury to determine whether the inference arising
from the doctrine has been rebutted as to any) particular doctor.
Id. at 411, 426 P.2d at 533, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (emphasis added).
i2s Though the question is not answered directly by the Anderson court, there
is a
statement in a footnote that
[o]n remand, defendants will have the opportunity to engage in discovery so as
to identify posible additional defendanits and will have the benefit of our liberal
joinder rules.
67 N.J. at 305 n.5, 338 A.2d at 8.
But see Inouye v. Black, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
In lnouye, a plaintiff suffered injury when a wire holding several vertebrae together
broke into smaller fragments than was anticipated, and after moving within the spinal
canal became lodged, necessitating surgical intervention. Id. at 32, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against his doctor, but after the
plaintiff's proofs were in, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. Id.
at 32-33, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 314. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that res ipsa mandated
that the case go to the jury, id. at 33, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 314, but the court disagreed, finding
that "common experience" suggested that the negligence of the manufacturer of the wire
or of the hospital which supplied it were as probable as that of the doctor, the only
defendant sued. Id. at 35, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 316. Therefore, the court held, "negligence
could not be inferred without some evidence reasonably pointing to the [defendant in the
case]." Id.
Inouye would thus suggest that where a probable agent of the injury would be
obvious to the plaintiff himself, the omission of such agent from the group of defendants
sued will result in the denial of any procedural advantage available where all "obvious"
defendants are stied.
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remains unidentified. 129 If the latter charge is proper and the jury
finds that all defendants have shown such care, but the jury must
nevertheless find one or more of the defendants liable, then upon
what basis are they to so find?' 3 0
Another important question raised by Anderson is what method
juries may use to apportion damages among multiple defendants who
are ultimately held liable. Must they distribute the loss equally
among all such defendants, or may they hold certain defendants liable
for more than their proportional share, based on either the proofs
presented or the degree of special responsibility or equitable duty
owed to the plaintiff? Such questions, although not addressed by
either opinion, will assume importance in the actions arising in the
wake of the decision. The answers must necessarily await the appeals
that cases similar to Anderson are virtually certain to generate.
It must be recognized, finally, that the situations involving unexplained injuries to unconscious patients outside the scope of medical

treatment have produced an abundance of what are decidedly "hard
cases." Very likely, criticism will be leveled at the Anderson rule as
creating, in some circumstances, liability without fault.13 ' Yet, the
better view is that the rule does nothing more than invert plaintiff's
traditional burden of proof, demanding instead that a defendant show
129 See 67 N.J. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6. The court here "accept[ed] the approach of the
Dierman majority" but did not explicitly state that this was precisely the burden defendants could meet. Id. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
130 This question formed the substance of a petition for certiorari filed in the United
States Supreme Court by the defendants Somberg (the doctor) and Reinhold-Schumann
(the seller of the rongeur). 44 U.S.L.W. 3133 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1975) (No. 75-373). The
argument presented was essentially that in establishing a standard for exoneration which
could theoretically be met by all defendants, while at the same time mandating that at
least one defendant be held liable, the New Jersey supreme court invited arbitrary and
unreasonable results, inconsistent with the guarantees of the due process clause of the
federal constitution. Petition for Certiorari of Defendant-Petitioners at 4-7, Somherg v.
Anderson, petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3133 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1975) (No. 75-373). An
argument was also made that in singling out particular defendants from a larger group
seen as potentially liable, the Anderson decision created a classification impermissible
under the equal protection clause. Id. at 9. The petition was denied by the Court. 96 S.
Ct. 279 (1975).
131 See 98 N.J.L.J. 556, 556 (1975), wherein the position is taken that insofar as
Anderson requires a verdict against one or more defendants, even though all defendants
have shown enough care to convince a jury that the plaintiff's injury was due to an
unpreventable cause, the "result would amount to a no-fault concept in this type of case."
Similar arguments have been made with respect to the California cases, especially Ybarra
and Dierman, upon which the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied in the Anderson
decision. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 17, at 1054-55, 1057. See also Comment, supra
note 89, at 121; Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Move Toward Strict Liability, 21
LoYoLA L. REV. 194, 203-04 (1975). See generally Morris, supra note 17.
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actual cause in a third party, or alternatively, show that within the
group of those potentially liable, the cause of injury lay more probably with some other defendant. This inversion reflects the court's
conclusion that it is more equitable that those who are responsible to
the unconscious patient and who are capable of protecting themselves
132
from losses bear the greater burden.
Joseph A. Carabillo

132 First of all, those involved in the enterprise of delivering medical care to patients

are in a position to improve their procedures for patient care. See Thode, supra note 115,
at 11. Second, since those persons engaging in medical practice have easier access to the
facts, Louisell & Williams, supra note 17, at 268, they would seemingly be in a better
position to preserve evidence which could possibly exonerate them at trial. See notes 17,
42, & 99 supra and accompanying text. Finally, these parties might spread the risk of any
loss by means of insurance. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 31, § 19.7, at 1089, in
which the authors speculated that this might have been an underlying factor in the
Ybarra decision.
For a discussion of several proposed no-fault insurance plans for medical accidents
see Comment, supra note 131, at 211-15.

